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1 Introduction
Over the last twenty years, the nature of conflicts has changed dramatically.
Whereas the typical conflict for which the United Nations has been set up
was between nations, we observe that more recent conflicts are not necessarily
across borders but rather between ethnic groups.1
These interethnic conflicts are clearly multi-faceted. Each conflict is dif-
ferent in its details and causes. A full understanding demands an interdisci-
plinary approach. The ethnological literature offers a large number of highly
valuable case studies of interethnic relations which form the basis on which
other social scientists may build their theories. However, they also provide a
variety of different theories on the roots and causes of interethnic conflicts.
These theories can be classified into two branches. The first branch involves a
social-psychology approach viewing ethnic groups as firmly bounded, durable
communities with a strong sense of a group identity. Within this branch, eth-
nic conflicts are the product of a deeply rooted ethnocentrism with a natural
hostility towards outsiders. The motives to engage in interethnic conflicts are
based on passion and involve a strong identification with the group.2 The
second branch can be viewed as a rationalist approach where ethnic groups
are perceived as social constructs sharing a solidarity towards material re-
wards. Here, ethnic conflict is based on calculation. As soon as the material
rewards of an ethnic group are threatened, the members of the group are
willing to engage in an interethnic conflict.3
In this model, we will take a different approach that uses an economist’s
perspective. We do not attempt to develop a full theory of interethnic con-
1During the romanian-american symposium on inter-ethnic relations in Bucharest in
1991, Donald Horowitz already pointed out that the concept of the nation-state is an
obsolete one, having lost both of its original meanings—the melting pot and the ethnic
state.
2A branch of social psychology analyses intergroup relations in the experimental labo-
ratory (see, for example, Brewer, 1979). They identified a preference for ingroup members
even under a minimal group setting where players were randomly allocated to each group.
However, it remains an unsolved question whether the origin of this ingroup bias lies in
the stronger identification with the ingroup or whether it is based on calculative grounds
such as generalized reciprocity motives (Yamagishi and Kyonari, 2000).
3A synthesis of both the passionate and the calculative theories is advocated by
Horowitz (1998).
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flicts but we will concentrate on the consequences of asymmetric information
in interethnic relations for achieving interethnic cooperation. We have cho-
sen an interethnic framework for various reasons. First, the spiral violence
commonly observed between ethnic groups following a transgression of one
person against a person from another ethnic group is captured well by our
institution analysis of collective outgroup punishment (see also, e.g., Fearon
and Laitin 1996). Secondly, many economic and political problems in today’s
developing countries originate in inefficient exchange levels between ethnic
groups due to a lack of trust.4 However, we would like to stress that our work
is not restricted to interethnic relations only. It can also be used for a large
variety of other intergroup relations, ranging from joint ventures between
firms to international trade settings, making our insights applicable to much
more general settings.
As a point of departure, we consider the following particularity that seems
to bear some commonality in the outbreak of interethnic conflicts. What-
ever the origin of the hostility may be, one small incidence where some ar-
bitary member of one group harms a member of the other group often trig-
gers a widespread aggression where all players of both groups get involved.
More specifically, individuals from the group of the harmed person retaliate
against randomly chosen individuals from the group of the initiator which
indicates that some form of a collective punishment is applied across groups.
This comes as a curiosity because both, the punishing individuals as well as
the punished individuals are usually not directly affected by the incidence
between the two individuals causing the escalation. There exist numerous
examples from history which resemble this common pattern of collective out-
group punishment (Greif et al., 1994, Hasluck, 1954, Boehm, 1994, Dumont,
1982, Tadjoeddin, 2004). Similar stories accumulate in today’s newspapers,
suggesting that there is an urge for finding proper political responses to these
problems. In this paper, we attempt to tackle two main questions. First,
how can such a collective punishment towards another group be explained
within a model with perfectly rational agents? Second, given that collective
outgroup punishment is chosen by ethnic groups, are there ways to prevent
4See, for example, Bowles and Gintis (2004) highlighting the efficiency loss from re-
stricting trade relations to only close ethnic group members.
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these escalations by introducing supplementary countervailing institutions?
To answer these questions, we set up the following game-theoretic model:
We consider a model with two ethnic groups with two players in each group.5
In each period, one player from each group is randomly matched in an out-
group pairing to choose between cooperation and defection in a Prisoner’s
Dilemma. This stage game is infinitely repeated and the strategies are com-
mon knowledge. We assume that the root of the problem in ethnical conflicts
is informational. Although we assume that all players are able to observe
the outcomes of the outgroup pairings, we make the assumption that across
groups, individuals cannot identify other individuals. This entails that, in
each outgroup pairing, no player from either group knows with whom she
is matched. The only thing they know is that they are matched with some
player from the other group. This is in contrast to the informational setting
within groups where identification of individual group members is possible,
that is, each player knows the personal histories of their group members.
We are interested in finding punishment strategies that induce the players in
the outgroup pairings to cooperate despite this informational problem across
groups.
In our model, we propose two punishment strategies. In the first pun-
ishment strategy (outgroup punishment), all players from an ethnic group
withhold cooperation in all subsequent outgroup pairings that follow the
first defection of an arbitrary player of the other ethnic group. Given our
identification assumption, players are not able to discipline individual players
from the other group by threatening to punish them directly. However, since
we assume that each player, including the defector, always has a positive
probability of being chosen for an outgroup pairing, the outgroup punish-
ment strategy may still serve as disciplining device for potential defectors.
We derive the condition under which a strategy profile, where all players
follow the outgroup punishment strategy, is a subgame perfect Nash equilib-
5In our model, ethnic group boundaries are exogenous. We want to focus on the
consequences of a population structured into ethnic groups. See McElreath et al. (2003)
on the evolution of ethnic markers in a population playing a coordination game. Further,
see Bowles and Gintis (2004) for the evolution of group boundaries who emphasize the
role of information in social interactions with incomplete contracts.
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rium (SPNE). Under this condition, interethnic cooperation can be achieved
on the equilibrium path. Since the defection of an arbitrary player triggers
defection of all players in all subsequent outgroup pairings, the resulting sit-
uation can be interpreted as an interethnic conflict. This event is, however,
an out-of-equilibrium event in our model.
The collective form of punishment is a direct response to the assumed infor-
mational problem across groups. The identification problem across groups
only allows for indiscriminate punishment strategies across groups. It is this
dilemma that gives rise to the above mentioned curiosity where players which
are not directly affected by the defection decision of an arbitrary player par-
ticipate in an interethnic conflict. Furthermore, it provides a rationale why
these players punish some random player from the other group.
Despite its ability to induce cooperation on the equilibrium path, the above
mentioned equilibrium is unappealing. It involves a strong negative exter-
nality off the equilibrium path since one arbitrary player is enough to trigger
an interethnic conflict where all players defect in outgroup pairings.
We propose a second punishment strategy (combined punishment) that
deals with this inefficiency off the equilibrium path. We introduce the possi-
bility that players may directly punish their ingroup members that have been
matched in outgroup pairings. The enforcement of the ingroup punishment
is assumed to be costly for both the punishing player and the player that
is punished. The incentives to punish an ingroup member for her defection
are given by the threat of a collective outgroup punishment. In the com-
bined punishment strategy, the outgroup punishment is initiated whenever
a player defects in an outgroup pairing without being punished sufficiently
by her group member. Again, we derive the conditions under which a strat-
egy profile, where all players follow the combined punishment strategy, is a
SPNE.
A comparison of the two punishment strategy profiles yields our main
finding. The combined punishment strategy profile, using outgroup as well
as ingroup punishment, yields more cooperation between ethnic groups than
the outgroup punishment strategy profile, using outgroup punishment only.
In particular, this is true in all cases where the cost of imposing the re-
quired ingroup punishment is less than the loss to be incurred on the group
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member who defected in the outgroup pairing. In all these cases, the range
of exogenous parameters under which cooperative equilibria exist is strictly
wider under the combined punishment strategy profile. In all other cases,
the ranges of exogenous parameters under which cooperative equilibria exist
coincide for the two punishment strategy profiles.
Our model bears relation to several strands of literature.6 We receive
our empirical backing from numerous ethnological case studies from both
anthropologists and historians.7 The wide range of ethnological theories of-
fers different approaches which should be viewed as complementary to our
model. The experiments of social psychologists offer interesting insights on
the psychological factors involved in ingroup and outgroup relations.8
Our model involves an infinitely repeated PD game with an analysis of a
community enforcement mechanism.9 In particular, it answers open ques-
tions from the analysis of Fearon and Laitin (1996) who consider an institu-
tion with in-group policing which uses ingroup punishment alone and a spiral
regime which uses outgroup punishment alone. In their model, they analyse
the two institutions separately. We believe that a simultaneous treatment of
ingroup and outgroup punishment allows to uncover interesting interaction
effects and, thereby, it yields new insights not present in a separate treat-
ment.10
Furthermore, the ingroup punishment does not involve any punishment costs
for the punisher in the model of Fearon and Laitin (1996). We believe that
the introduction of an ingroup punishment that is costly to the punished
6We will only present a short review of the related literature here. A more detailed
discussion of the relevant literature is provided in part 3 of this paper.
7See, for example, Cohen (1969), Unesco (1974), Greif et al. (1994), Dumont (1982),
Hasluck (1954).
8See Bornstein (2003) for an approach that analyzes interethnic conflicts as team games
between groups. His work deals with the dilemma originating in the differences between
individual, group and the collective interest which are inherent in interethnic conflict situ-
ations. See Yamagishi and Kyonari (2000) on the motives for ingroup favoritism based on
generalized reciprocity. For a review on the ingroup bias in minimal intergroup situations,
we refer to Brewer (1979).
9See, for example, Kandori (1992) for a game-theoretic analysis of community enforce-
ment mechanisms.
10Tadjoeddin (2004) highlighted the need to combine ingroup and outgroup punishment
to moderate communal violence in the context of Indonesian society.
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player as well as the punisher is more realistic. In our argument, we do not
fall back on indirect reciprocity or altruistic motives (Fehr and Fischbacher,
2004, Falk et al., 2001) although these motives are certainly involved in
interethnic relations as well. We keep the assumption of players with self-
regarding preferences instead and we show that even then, players punish
their ingroup members despite the costs involved.
Greif (2002, 2005) provides a game theoretic model with ingroup and
outgroup punishment to describe the community responsibility system used
in Europe during the late medieval period. His analysis shows that this
institution allowed for impersonal exchange despite the lack of impartial legal
enforcement by a third party. Our model supplements his work in that
it focuses on the efficiency gain of introducing ingroup punishment to an
institution based only on collective punishment.
We view the outbreak of ethnic conflicts as a consequence of an infor-
mational problem that inhibits any conditioning of strategies on personal
histories of actions of individual players from the other group. This assump-
tion can be motivated as follows. Ethnic groups are often characterised by
dense social networks which allow them to easily exchange information on
past behaviour of other group members. One may imagine that especially
small ethnic groups have a well-developed system of gossip and rumours
which allows to get information about other group members at very low
costs.11 Interactions across ethnic groups frequently lack these information
transmission possibilities. Whereas players know the personal histories of
their group members, they are not able to attach any corresponding labels
onto the players from the other group. Fearon and Laitin (1996) recognize
this informational asymmetry between and within groups in their model as
well and emphasize in the introduction that "any institutional regime for
maintaining cooperation across groups must somehow address the problem
this asymmetry poses" (p.719).
The consequence of this lack of information assumption about the players
11Fearon and Laitin (1996) mention the role of institutions such as churches, schools or
respected elders which may be understood as delimiters of ethnic groups by certifying and
advertising the reputations of individual players within their ethnic community. See also
Colson (1974) who emphasizes the network effect within ethnic groups through gossip.
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from the other group is that no player is able to learn about the history of
play of the player they are currently matched with. This includes that even
if the players in the current outgroup pairing have already been matched
in preceding outgroup pairings, they are not able to recognize each other.
Our assumption is not designed to capture interethnic interactions between
players (e.g. two traders) that interact in long-term relationships with each
other on a frequent basis. Instead, we concentrate on the class of intereth-
nic interactions which are characterised by informational asymmetries and
relatively infrequent outgroup pairings between the same two agents.
A better understanding of the mechanisms involved in interethnic rela-
tions not only helps to better understand history but it provides valuable
insights for the development of trust-enhancing institutions which were and
still are necessary to enable exchange markets to function properly. One
important historical lesson in the establishment of exchange markets in de-
veloping countries is that these countries lack the necessary trust-enhancing
pre-state institutions which were present when state institutions were intro-
duced in Western societies in the late medieval period. The missing pre-state
institutions are among the reasons why the introduction of state institutions
did not yield the same functioning markets in the developing world as we ex-
pected from modern western societies. We can learn from historical analysis
how the necessary decentralized institutions were formed in medieval trade
and these insights could be helpful in developing countries today.
The paper is structured as follows. Part 2 presents the social dilemma
between the groups. Part 2.1 introduces an institution with outgroup punish-
ment alone which solves the social dilemma for a exogenous parameter regime
to be specified. However, it is based on a punishment institution that is not
satisfactory off the equilibrium path. One incidence of a defection triggers
a collective punishment between both groups comparable to an interethnic
conflict. Part 2.2 tries to find an institution which mitigates this problem
through the supplementary introduction of an ingroup punishment yielding
a combined punishment institution. Part 2.3 compares the two punishment
institutions and analyses in which cases the combined punishment strategy
profile yields more cooperation. Finally, in part 3, we look at the related
literature and in part 4, we provide a conclusion.
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2 The model
Imagine two ethnic groups K = A,B. In each ethnic group, there are two
players Ki with i = 1, 2.12 They play an infinitely repeated stage game ΓF
which runs as follows.
Matching Process. In each period, an arbitrary player from one group is
matched with an arbitrary player from the other group. Such a match will
subsequently be referred to as an outgroup pairing. We assume that there is
only one outgroup pairing per period.
Definition 1 An outgroup pairing has a player Ai randomly matched with
a player Bj from the other group.
In each period, one arbitrary player from each group is chosen for the out-
group pairing. The matching in each period t is independent. Let µ(Ai, t) be
player A0is match at time t where the set can be possibly empty. We assume
that player i is randomly drawn for an outgroup pairing in period t from
group K according to a uniform distribution. Since the sample space has
only two elements13 drawn from a uniform distribution, the probability for
player Ai to be matched with any player from the other group B is
Pr
©
∪2j=1(µ(Ai, t) = Bj)
ª
= Pr {Ai} ·
"
2X
j=1
Pr {Bj}
#
= 1/2 · 1 = 1/2 ≡ ηo.
so that ηo denotes the probability with which an arbitrary player from an
arbitrary group Ki is drawn for an outgroup pairing in each period.14
Payoffs. Both players in the outgroup pairing play a prisoners’ dilemma
(PD). The players simultaneously decide about whether to cooperate aKi = c
or to defect aKi = d. The action space is therefore aKi ∈ {c, d}.
12See the concluding section for a motivation of why we consider only two players in
each group.
13The sample space is {K1,K2} for each group K = A,B, i.e. either player K1 or player
K2 from each group is chosen for the outgroup pairing.
14The probability for player Ai to meet a specific player Bj is
Pr {µ(Ai, t) = Bj} = Pr {Ai} · Pr {Bj} = 1/4 for i, j = 1, 2.
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Player Ai
Player Bj
c d
c Πcc,Πcc Πcd,Πdc
d Πdc,Πcd Πdd,Πdd
(1)
The normal form representation of the static game is as in Matrix (1). By
the PD game structure, payoffs are such that Πcc < Πdc, Πcd < Πdd and
Πcc > Πdd. In a one-shot situation, choosing d is the dominant strategy
for both players in any outgroup pairing. The equilibrium outcome (d, d) is
Pareto inefficient compared to the outcome where both players cooperate,
i.e. (c, c).
Information structure. The strategies of the players are assumed to be
common knowledge. After the two players in the outgroup pairing interact,
all players from both groups observe the outcome so that there is perfect
information transmission among all players concerning the outcomes of the
outgroup pairings.15 However, there is an idenfication problem across groups.
Assumption 1 Although all players are able to observe what has been chosen
in the outgroup pairings, a player Ai is not able to tell which particular player
Bj from the other group was responsible for the action choice. A player
Ki can only identify and know the personal history of action choices of an
individual player Kj from her own group, with i 6= j.
This assumption essentially means that all players of an ethnic group look
alike for players of the other ethnic group. The only characteristic which is
observable across groups is the affiliation of the player to the other group.
Only players of the same ethnic group can distinguish between individual
players in their group.16
15More realistic models could be developed where only the players involved in the out-
group pairings know of the outcomes. The transmission of this information to the other
players in the groups would have to be modeled (Buskens and Weesie 1999). There might
be the possibility of "telling lies" about the outcomes. However, we do not model these
possibilities here since we want to focus on the effect of an identification problem across
groups.
16We refer to the introduction for a motivation of this assumption. See also Fearon and
Laitin (1996).
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Note that, with this assumption, it is not possible to develop punishment
strategies that condition on the past history of the individual players from the
other group. Although it is known to the players that there was an incidence
of a defection by a player from the other group, it is not possible for players
in our model to recognize this player in future outgroup pairings. Individual
punishment of defectors from the other group is therefore not applicable as a
means to induce cooperation across groups. We have to find other strategies
in order to achieve cooperative outcomes.
2.1 Institution 1: Outgroup Punishment
In this section, we analyse how cooperation in outgroup pairings might be
achieved through sanctions across groups with an identification problem be-
tween the groups. We assume that there is no state who enforces sanctions
against defecting players of both groups. Further, the only punishment that
players can apply across groups is to reciprocate defection by withholding
cooperation on their part in subsequent outgroup pairings.17
Consider the following community enforcement mechanism. The inability
to identify players across groups destroys the possibility for the group mem-
ber of the victim or the victim herself to target a punishment on a player
who previously chose defection in an outgroup pairing. The only possible
punishment that players across ethnic groups can apply is a collective form
of punishment.
Definition 2 An outgroup punishment (OGP) has all players from one
group, whenever chosen for an outgroup pairing, defect against all players
from the other group with whom they are paired.
Let ht = {a0, ..., at−1} denote the history of action choices of the players
in the outgroup pairings up to period t − 1 where aτ = (aτAi , aτBj) denotes
the vector of action choices by player Ai and Bj in period τ . Each history ht
(t = 0, ...,∞) satisfies one of the following conditions:
17We do not consider other forms of retaliation across groups such as physically attacking
defectors or denying them access to territories. Boyd and Richerson (1992) refer to these
alternative forms of punishment as retribution strategies.
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I. For t = 0, ht = ∅.
The type I history refers to the initial period’s history.
II. @aτ for τ ∈ {0, ..., t− 1} such that aτKj = d for at least one Kj
The type II history refers to the class of subgames where no player
defected in any of the previous outgroup pairings.
III. ∃aτ for τ ∈ {0, ..., t− 1} such that aτKj = d for at least one Kj
The type III history refers to the class of subgames where at least one
player defected in any of the previous outgroup pairings.
Consider the following strategy θKi.
Definition 3 Let the outgroup punishment strategy θKi be defined as
aKi,t(ht) =
(
c
d
if ht is of type I or II
if ht is of type III
.
In words, this breaks down to the following. In outgroup interactions,
players start with cooperation. As soon as an arbitrary player of an arbitrary
group defects, switch to defection against all players from the other group
forever.18
Consider an infinite repetition of the stage game ΓF and let δ denote the
discount factor.19 The strategy profile Θ, where both players play strategy
θKi, describes an equilibrium in which cooperation between groups can be
achieved on the equilibrium path by the threat of an outgroup punishment
for all subsequent periods as defined above. The following proposition derives
the condition under which this strategy profile is a SPNE.
18The length of the outgroup punishment phase is not crucial in deriving our main
argument. For the general case of a T ∈ {0, ...,∞} period outgroup punishment phase, we
refer to Stoff (2004).
19A finite repetition of the game ΓF does not yield cooperative outcomes on the equi-
librium path. A backward induction argument makes this point clear. Consider the last
period. Then the game essentially becomes a one-shot situation with the familiar out-
come prediction of (d, d). The prediction of the last period outcome again destroys any
incentives to cooperate in the next to last period and so on.
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Proposition 1 The strategy profile Θ, with all players in both groups playing
strategy θKi, is a SPNE if and only if
Πdc −Πcc
Πcc
≤ δ
1− δηo. (2)
The proof is given inAppendix A.1. Intuitively, the left-hand term Π
dc−Πcc
Πcc
represents the short-term deviation gain from defection over cooperation ex-
pressed in percentage terms. This short-term gain must be smaller than the
right-hand side which represents the gain from having interethnic coopera-
tion over an interethnic conflict in the form of defection in all subsequent
outgroup pairings.
We have proposed one possible strategy profile that may induce intereth-
nic cooperation with the threat of outgroup punishment. However, it is not
without "adverse effects". A player’s action choice has a direct effect on
the payoff of the player from the other group she is matched with in the
outgroup pairing. However, in a world where identification of players from
other groups is not possible and players choose collective forms of outgroup
punishment as a consequence, there are indirect effects as well. The defector
is not the only one to receive defection in all subsequent outgroup pairings.
If a player defects, her action choice creates a huge negative externality on all
the other player because she alone ignites a collective outgroup punishment
that affects all subsequent outgroup pairings in our model.
More figuratively, we can also interpret such an outgroup punishment
phase as an interethnic conflict. With our strategy profile from above, we
have modelled the interethnic conflict as an off-equilibrium event. One inci-
dent of an arbitrary member of an ethnic community haggling someone from
the other ethnic community is enough to set in motion a spiral of violence
between the two groups.20 Case studies indicate that collective forms of an
outgroup punishment seem to be highly relevant from an empirical point of
view.21 We believe that these indirect effects pose one of the key problems
20By this reason, the term spiral equilibrium is used to define the equilibrium found by
Fearon and Laitin (1996) which also uses a trigger strategy with a collective punishment
regime between groups.
21Greif (1997) gives examples of collective punishments from the Middle Ages. Hasluck
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for achieving interethnic cooperation.
However, as we will show in the next section, this is not the only possible
strategy profile that is able to achieve interethnic cooperation. In the out-
group punishment strategy profile, the ingroup members of the players in the
outgroup pairing remain completely passive. Despite their ability to identify
a potential defector in their group, they do not apply any punishment on
their group member for defecting against the player from the other group.
However, they suffer from the defection of her group member through the
outgroup punishment phase that follows the defection. In the next section,
we will propose a punishment strategy profile which uses the identification
possibility of players within each group by giving them the possibility of
punishing their group member. It will combine outgroup and ingroup pun-
ishment to induce cooperation across ethnic groups.
2.2 Institution 2: Outgroup and Ingroup Punishment
We introduce a new two-stage game ΓFP which runs as follows. We add the
possibility of an ingroup punishment. Let FKi denote an action choice that
corresponds to a punishment imposed by a player of one group on another
player of the same group.
In the first stage of ΓFP , players in the outgroup pairing play the original
game ΓF . In the second stage of ΓFP , each playerKi that has not been chosen
for the outgroup pairing has to decide about how much ingroup punishment
FKi = [0,∞) she imposes on her group member Kj that was chosen for the
outgroup pairing in the first stage of ΓFP .
We assume that, whenever an ingroup punishment is imposed, it is costly
for both players, the player on whom it is imposed and the player who imposes
the punishment. The higher the choice of F , the higher the loss incurred to
the punished player and the higher the cost for the punishing player as well.22
The following definition summarizes the ingroup punishment.
(1954) provides a study on Albanian blood feuds. See also Boehm (1994) and Dumont
(1982).
22These costs can be interpreted as the losses to the punisher from creating an unpleasant
atmosphere within her group through the execution of an ingroup punishment. We exclude
the possibility that a punisher enjoys punishing a group member.
14
Definition 4 An ingroup punishment (IGP) is a sanction FKi imposed
on an individual player Kj by her group member Ki, i 6= j. This sanction
involves a loss of FDKj for the sanctioned player where
FDKj(FKi) = FKi
and a loss of FPKi for the sanctioning player with
FPKi(FKi) = f(FKi) (3)
where f : D→ R+, D ⊆ R+, is a monotonically increasing function in D.
Let FD > 0 denote the minimum loss to a punished player that is de-
manded in the specification of the strategies of each player in order to for-
give the defection of the punished player in a preceding period. Let F de-
note the corresponding punishment choice of the punishing player.23 Let
ht = {x0, ..., xt−1} denote the history of action choices up to period t − 1
where xτ = (aτ , F τ ) with aτ = (aτAi , a
τ
Bj) and F
τ = (F τAj , F
τ
Bi) denotes the
vector of action choices by the players Ai and Bj chosen for the outgroup
pairing and the players Aj and Bi who decide about the ingroup punish-
ment in period τ . Each history ht (t = 0, ...,∞) satisfies one of the following
conditions:
I. For t = 0, ht = ∅.
The type I history refers to the initial period’s history.
II. @xτ for τ ∈ {0, ..., t− 1} such that (aτKj = d for at least oneKj)∧(F τKi <
F with FDKj < F
D)
The type II history refers to the class of subgames where, in all pre-
ceding periods, both players either have cooperated or the defecting
23In the strategies below, we assume that all players demand the same minimum pun-
ishment F . This way we exclude the possibility that one group or player demands a higher
minimum punishment to make her forgive a defection, i.e. that some players expect dif-
ferent ingroup punishments.
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player has been punished by her group member in the second stage of
the same period.24
III. ∃xτ for τ ∈ {0, ..., t− 1} such that (aτKj = d for at least oneKj)∧(F τKi <
F with FDKj < F
D)
The type III history refers to the class of subgames where there exists
a preceding period where a defecting player was not punished by her
group member with at least F in that period.
In order to define a proper strategy φKi(F
D) which prescribes not only
an action choice for the players in the first stage but also for the players in
the second stage of ΓFP , i.e. the ingroup punishment decision FKi,t, we have
to classify all the types of subgames which may arise up to the second stage
of ΓFP . Let eht denote the history of each class of subgames. Fix a group K.
Each history eht (t = 0, ...,∞) satisfies one of the following conditions:
eI. Suppose ht to be of type I or II; and atKj = c.fII. Suppose ht to be of type I or II; and atKj = d.gIII. Suppose ht to be of type III; and an arbitrary atKj .
Consider the following combined punishment strategy φKi(F
D).
Definition 5 Let the combined punishment strategy φKi(F
D) be defined
as
aKi,t(ht) =
(
c
d
if ht is of type I and II
if ht is of type III
and
FKi,t(eht) =
(
0
F
if eht is of type eI orgIII
if eht is of type fII
for i 6= j.
24Essentially, this means that the victim’s group forgives the defection of a previous
period when the defector is ingroup punished with a punished player’s loss of FD ≥ FD
in that period.
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In words, the strategy φKi(F
D) breaks down to the following. In outgroup
interactions, start with cooperation. If it is observed that an arbitrary player
of an arbitrary group defects and this defection is punished by the defector’s
group member with FD ≥ FD, then continue with cooperation.25
However, if this defection is not punished by the defector’s group member
with FD ≥ FD, then defect in all subsequent outgroup pairings.26
In ingroup interactions, do not punish ingroup members when they cooperate.
Do not punish them either when they defect in an outgroup punishment
phase. However, as soon as your ingroup member chose defection in the first
stage of ΓFP during an outgroup cooperation phase, then choose to punish
the defector by imposing a sanction of FD ≥ FD on her.27
Consider an infinitely repeated play of the two-stage game ΓFP .28 The fol-
lowing proposition derives the conditions under which the combined punish-
ment strategy profile Φ(FD), with all players in both groups playing strategy
φKi(F
D), is a SPNE.
Proposition 2 Suppose
FP =
δ
1− δηoΠ
cc (4)
and
FP = f(FD) (5)
25This means that the players of the other group forgive the defection when it is punished
by the defector’s group member.
26Note that ingroup punishment at some later period does not provoke cooperation of
the players of the other group.
27With the possibility to sanction a group mateKj whenever she chooses to defect in the
first stage of ΓFP , the sanctioning player Ki can get player Kj to internalize the negative
externality. The sanctioning player may, thus, be able to induce player Kj to cooperate
in the first stage of ΓFP if the loss FDKj from the ingroup punishment is severe enough.
28A backward induction argument again shows that a finite repetition of ΓFP under
complete information would not yield cooperation in any period. In the last subgame
which corresponds to the second stage of ΓFP , the dominant strategy is clearly not to
impose the sanction FKi since there is no gain from sanctioning to compensate the sanction
costs FPKi . In the next to last subgame, i.e. the first stage of ΓFP , players in the outgroup
pairing anticipate that there will be no ingroup punishment in the last stage. Therefore,
the prisoner’s dilemma (1) is played as a one-shot game with the familiar outcome (d, d).
Therefore, the prediction for the last period of the two-stage game ΓFP is (d, d, 0, 0). This
again destroys any incentives to punish in the second stage of ΓFP in the period before and
so on. An announcement to punish a defector is therefore not credible in a finitely repeated
game under complete information (see Kreps et al., 1982, for incomplete information).
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with f defined as above and
FD ≥ Πdc −Πcc. (6)
If and only if
FP ≤ FP , (7)
then the combined punishment strategy profile Φ(FD), where all players in
both groups play strategy φKi(F
D) defined as above, is a SPNE.
The proof is given in Appendix A.2. We have seen that if and only if
FP ≤ FP , the combined punishment strategy profile is a SPNE in which
interethnic cooperation can be achieved by the threat of ingroup punishment.
The reason for executing the ingroup punishment is to make the other group
forgive the instance of defection of one’s group member and thus, continue
with cooperation in subsequent outgroup pairings. In order to make the
other group forgive defection, the ingroup punishment must be higher than
the minimum demanded by the other group, i.e. FD ≥ FD. To determine
the level of FD the other group demands at least, we reason as follows: The
primary interest of each group is to get cooperation from the players of the
other group. Therefore, they demand an ingroup punishment whose threat
is able to induce cooperation in the first stage of ΓFP . Going back to the
first stage of ΓFP , we can show that the ingroup punishment must satisfy
FD ≥ Πdc − Πcc.29 If the other group observes that an ingroup punishment
satisfying this condition is executed, then they forgive the defection and
continue with cooperation in the subsequent outgroup pairings.
However, there is also an upper limit for the ingroup punishment to be
considered which ensures that it will be applied in SPNE. A more severe
ingroup punishment F also involves higher costs FP for the punisher. The
upper bound is given by (4). Since FP = f(FD), condition (6) can be used
to derive the lower bound for FP in condition (5). If and only if parameters
29The loss for the punished player from the ingroup punishment must be higher than
the surplus of defection over cooperation in the outgroup pairing.
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satisfy FP ≤ FP , then the players from the ethnic groups will find it optimal
to apply the ingroup punishment to induce interethnic cooperation.
Consider now the case where FP > FP . The parameters are such that
there exists no SPNE where players punish their group member. In partic-
ular, this is true when f(FD) is such that the demanded minimum loss is
too costly for the punisher. Imagine, for example, a situation where players
value "peace" within their group much higher than "peace" with the other
group. In such a situation, players will not threaten the internal peace within
their group by applying ingroup sanctions in order to achieve external peace
with the other group. By not punishing their defecting group member, play-
ers prefer to accept the collective outgroup punishment instead. Whether a
strategy profile with an ingroup punishment component will thus be applied
by the players of the ethnic groups, primarily depends on the shape of the
function f(FD).
However, even with FP > FP we may get the two groups to cooperate
even without ingroup punishment. This is true whenever the threat of out-
group punishment alone is strong enough to induce interethnic cooperation
or, analogously to our condition in the outgroup punishment strategy profile
(2), if Πdc −Πcc < V + − V −. Therefore, even though the combined strategy
profile is not a SPNE since the prescribed ingroup punishment is not chosen,
we may still have cooperative outcomes on the equilibrium path.
Note that all Πdc − Πcc ≤ FD ≤ f−1(FD) = FP are possible FD strat-
egy parameters that all yield interethnic cooperation with ingroup punish-
ment. However, in terms of efficiency, the lowest possible FD is preferred by
both ethnic groups off the equilibrium path, should a group member defect
("trembling hand") at some point. We conclude that, in this sense, the best
equilibrium is the one where FD = Πdc−Πcc so that FP = f(Πdc−Πcc) ≤ FP .
2.3 Comparison between the two institutions
We analysed two institutions. Each institution offers a set of possible ac-
tions for the players. The first one offers outgroup punishment by witholding
cooperation in subsequent outgroup pairings. The second adds ingroup pun-
ishment in the form of a sanction F from the punisher to the punished within
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a group. Within each institution, a strategy profile was proposed that po-
tentially provides interethnic cooperation on the equilibrium path.
In this section, we analyse which strategy profile is more susceptible for
cooperative outcomes between ethnic groups. In particular, we ask whether
adding ingroup punishment to the outgroup punishment predicts cooperative
outcomes for a wider range of exogenous parameter values. Further, we
specify the condition when the ingroup punishment is actually applied, when
outgroup punishment alone is enough to induce cooperation or when both
strategy profiles fail to induce cooperation between the two groups.
For illustration purposes, we consider strategy profiles with parameter
choices of FD = Πdc − Πcc only. Four different combinations of exogenous
parameters may arise. We present for each regime whether the strategy
profiles Φ(FD) and Θ are SPNE.
1.
£
V + − V − ≤ Πdc −Πcc ≤ f(Πdc −Πcc)
¤
∨
£
V + − V − ≤ f(Πdc −Πcc) ≤ Πdc −Πcc
¤
;
none of the strategy profiles Φ(FD) and Θ are SPNE.
2. f(Πdc −Πcc) ≤ V + − V − ≤ Πdc −Πcc;
only Φ(FD) is an SPNE.
3.
£
f(Πdc −Πcc) ≤ Πdc −Πcc ≤ V + − V −
¤
∨
£
Πdc −Πcc ≤ f(Πdc −Πcc) ≤ V + − V −
¤
;
both Φ(FD) and Θ are SPNE.
4. Πdc −Πcc ≤ V + − V − ≤ f(Πdc −Πcc);
only Θ is an SPNE.
How do the two strategy profiles compare when it comes to their potential
for achieving interethnic cooperation? The following lemma claims that the
parameter regime with cooperative outcomes on the equilibrium path is at
least as wide under strategy profile Φ(FD) as under Θ.
Lemma 1 If we have interethnic cooperation in equilibrium under the out-
group punishment strategy profile Θ, then we necessarily have interethnic
cooperation in equilibrium under the combined punishment strategy profile
Φ(FD). However, the converse is not true.
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For the proof, we refer to Appendix A.3. The central force that determines
whether cooperative outcomes are possible for a wider range of exogenous
parameter values is the shape of the function FP = f(FD). To be more
specific, consider the linear function
FP = αFD
with the exogenous parameter α > 0. A low value of α indicates that exe-
cuting an ingroup punishment does not involve high costs to the punisher.
Clearly, we see that if we have an α > 1, then executing an ingroup punish-
ment causes a bigger loss to the punisher than to the punished player.
For the strategy profile Φ(FD) to be a SPNE, we know from condition
(19) that we need
α(Πdc −Πcc) ≤ V + − V −. (8)
For the strategy profile Θ to be a SPNE, we need
Πdc −Πcc ≤ V + − V −. (9)
Comparing the conditions (8) and (9) highlights the similarities between
the two punishment strategy profiles. In the outgroup punishment strategy
profile, there exists no ingroup punishment. The "only" threat that the
players in the outgroup pairing have to fear is the threat of a collective
outgroup punishment. Through defection they will initiate an infinitely-long
outgroup punishment phase and, whenever they are chosen in a subsequent
outgroup pairing, they will be punished for their defection. The condition
for interethnic cooperation under the outgroup punishment strategy profile
(9) looks similar to the one for the combined punishment strategy profile (8).
However, the nature of the threat is different. The threat that players in the
outgroup pairing have to fear comes from within their respective group. The
group members decide upon the ingroup punishment by comparing the long-
term negative externality V + − V − from the defecting player of their group
with the short-term cost FP of punishing the defector within their group.
The players cooperate in the first stage if the gain from defecting Πdc − Πcc
is smaller than the loss from the ingroup punishment FD. Therefore, the
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sanction FD replaces the loss from an outgroup punishment phase V +− V −
as a device to discipline a player to cooperate in an outgroup pairing. So
whenever
α(Πdc −Πcc) < Πdc −Πcc
or α < 1 and
α(Πdc −Πcc) ≤ V + − V −,
the set of exogenous parameters that yield cooperative outcomes is strictly
larger under the combined punishment strategy profile.
Comparing the conditions for interethnic cooperation for the two strategy
profiles allows us to illustrate the effect of different values for α more clearly.
Let bΠ = Πdc−ΠccΠcc denote the one-time deviation gain from unilateral defection
in an outgroup pairing. Recall that ηo = 0.5 under a uniform distribution
sampling for the outgroup pairings with two players in each group.
Condition 2 The condition for interethnic cooperation under the outgroup
punishment strategy profile Θ is
δ ≥ 2
bΠ
1 + 2bΠ . (10)
That is, the discount factor must be high enough with respect to the
one-time deviation gain. A higher discount factor δ could be interpreted as
a shortening of the time lag between outgroup pairings. Loosely spoken, this
means that players encounter players from the other ethnic group more often.
This, in turn, makes an outgroup punishment strategy more effective as a
disciplining device for achieving interethnic cooperation.
Condition 3 The condition for interethnic cooperation under the combined
punishment strategy profile Φ(FD) is
δ ≥
(
2αbΠ
1+2αbΠ
2bΠ
1+2bΠ
if 0 < α < 1
if α ≥ 1
. (11)
The condition is derived in the Appendix A.4. Comparing conditions
(10) and (11) indicates the central role of the parameter α for evaluating the
power of the two strategy profiles for achieving interethnic cooperation.
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The following proposition presents the main result of our analysis.
Proposition 3 The combined punishment strategy profile, using outgroup as
well as ingroup punishment, yields more cooperation between ethnic groups
than the outgroup punishment strategy profile, using outgroup punishment
only. This is true in the sense that, ∀α < 1, the range of exogenous pa-
rameters under which cooperative equilibria exist is strictly wider under the
combined punishment strategy profile.
Figure (1) depicts the various regimes where interethnic cooperation is
possible for three different values of α. If α = 1, then we have the border
case in which players are indifferent between averting the collective outgroup
punishment by executing the minimum demanded ingroup punishment and
bearing the future costs of the collective outgroup punishment by not execut-
ing the necessary ingroup punishment. For higher values of α, the ingroup
punishment that is demanded by the other group becomes too expensive for
the punisher. She prefers to bear the collective outgroup punishment in-
stead. Therefore, the ingroup punishment that is demanded in the combined
strategy profile will not be applied. This does not mean, however, that in-
terethnic cooperation breaks down under the combined punishment profile.
The threat of the collective outgroup punishment, being a part of the com-
bined strategy profile, is still present. In fact, for all values of α ≥ 1, the
regimes of exogenous parameters that enable interethnic cooperation coincide
for the outgroup and the combined strategy profile. This regime corresponds
to region IV in figure (1).
The main advantage of the combined punishment strategy profile, and, in
particular, the addition of ingroup punishment, becomes apparent for α < 1.
Consider, for example, region III. Here, interethnic cooperation cannot be
sustained with the outgroup punishment strategy profile. However, for α =
0.5, the costs for executing the demanded ingroup punishment are low enough
so that it pays to avert the collective outgroup punishment by punishing one’s
defecting group member. Clearly, the set of exogenous parameters larger for
the combined strategy profile (region III and IV ) compared to set under
the outgroup punishment strategy profile (region IV ). The figure (1) also
depicts the situation for α = 0.2 with an even stronger difference between
23
the set under the combined punishment (region II, III and IV ) and the
outgroup punishment (region IV ) strategy profile. Region I corresponds to
the set of exogenous parameters where none of the two strategy profiles is
able to sustain interethnic cooperation for α = 0.2.
Figure 1: The different regimes for interethnic cooperation
The following corollary concludes this section. It summarizes the role of
the costs for punishing ingroup members for establishing cooperation across
groups as well as the main comparative static results for both institutions.
Corollary 1 The lower the costs for the players to punish their ingroup
member, i.e., the lower α is for the linear function FP = αFD, the larger
the regime of exogenous parameters where interethnic cooperation can be sus-
tained in the combined strategy profile. It is strictly larger for all α ≤ 1. A
higher discount factor δ and a lower ratio Π
dc−Πcc
Πcc raise c.p. the incentives to
cooperate in outgroup pairings in both institutions.
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3 Related Literature
Our paper bears relation to several strands of literature. The recent game-
theoretic literature has sought to extend the result that cooperation can be
achieved in infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games between two play-
ers if they are patient enough. The authors assumed various informational
settings and analysed whether cooperation can be achieved within networks
of players where the agents are randomly matched in each period. Kandori
(1992) and Buskens and Weesie (1999) show that in these cases, it is not
necessary that players repeatedly meet with the same partner to be able to
establish a trust relationship. Whether trust works for achieving cooperative
outcomes on the equilibrium path depends on the direct observability of the
action choices of group members or on the way how information about the
player’s experiences with their partners is transmitted between the players
within the network.30 If all player’s past actions are publicly observable and
each player can be identified, Kandori (1992) shows that cooperative out-
comes are possible for the same discount factor with an arbitrary population
size and matching rule as in the two-player repeated game where the victim
is able to punish the defector directly. Buskens and Weesie (1999) analyse an
infinitely repeated game between one trustee and a network of trustors. In
each period, either the same trustor or a new trustor is matched for the inter-
action with the trustee. Whether the new trustor is able to get information
about the past action choices of the trustee depends on whether she has a tie
with the previous trustor in the network. If there is a tie between the previ-
ous and the new trustor, then information about the past action choices of
the trustee is communicated and the new trustor is able to condition her play
on this information. Depending on how dense the network of the trustors is,
i.e. how many ties there are between the players, the better a decentralized
30A rather modern form of financing small-scale projects used by the Grameen Bank
in Bangladesh uses the advantage that players within networks know each other’s action
choices better than an outside party like a bank. They are more efficient in punishing their
group members for failing to contribute to the group’s interest. In this form of financing,
the bank holds the entire group jointly liable for repaying the debt of any member of their
group and therefore, it is in the public interest of the group that every member pays back
her debt. Ingroup punishment is applied if a player is able to repay her part but decides
to free ride instead (Besley, Coate, 1995, La Ferrara, 1999).
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punishment institution works to induce the trustee to cooperate, i.e. to honor
trust. Even if no information can be transmitted and players are not able to
identify other players, there exist equilibria with cooperative outcomes such
as contagious equilibria where players defect whenever they experienced an
incidence of defection in one of their past matches (Kandori, 1992, Ellison,
1994).
All these models are highly valuable for analysing interactions within groups.
In particular, the network advantages inherent in ethnic groups which come
close to a situation of perfect public observability pose an ideal setting for
applying the community enforcement mechanism proposed, for example, by
Kandori (1992). However, the models have to be adapted to analyse inter-
actions across groups which are characterised by the special informational
setting we impose in our model where we have full identification within the
ethnic group31 but no identification of players across groups.
An interesting approach is offered by Bowles and Gintis (2004) who
use an evolutionary model to explain the boundaries of ethnic groups. In
their model, the foregone opportunities by not trading with outgroup players
are offset by an enhanced ability to solve problems of incomplete contracts
through a higher level of trust among ingroup players. The analysis of this
trade-off allows them to explain the evolution of persistent parochialism of
ethnic groups.32
Our model is perhaps closest to Fearon and Laitin (1996). They analyse
an institution with in-group policing which uses ingroup punishment alone
and a spiral regime which uses outgroup punishment alone. However, in their
model, the execution of ingroup punishment is assumed to be costless for the
punisher. We believe that the introduction of an ingroup punishment which
is not only costly to the punished but to the punishing player as well is more
realistic. In their model, the introduction of such an ingroup punishment
would lead to a breakdown of their in-group policing equilibrium because the
31The bigger the groups, the less plausible the full information assumption within groups
appears. So in this respect, our model of decentralised ingroup punishment works best in
small groups.
32See also McElreath et al. (2003) for the evolution of ethnic markers as a response to
a coordination game.
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incentives would be such that no ingroup punishment would ever be applied
by rational agents.
Further, we focus on prisoner’s dilemma games between ethnic groups only
whereas Fearon and Laitin (1996) model intra- and interethnic prisoner’s
dilemmas simultaneously. However, this simplification does not weaken our
arguments since our focus is on interethnic interactions and we subsumed all
possible effects of intra- on interethnic interactions in our reduced-form func-
tion of ingroup punishment. The benefits of this simplification are that it
allows us to analyse both ingroup and outgroup punishment simultaneously
in a tractable manner. In the institution with outgroup punishment alone,
the only punishment that a player in the outgroup pairing may expect comes
from the other group. In the combined punishment strategy, the punishment
either comes from within the group or from the other group. The analy-
sis of the second institution can be seen as the major novel contribution of
this model. To our knowlegde, no analysis existed so far that provided such
a simultaneous treatment. The simultaneous inclusion of ingroup and out-
group punishment yields new insights in the mechanisms that characterise a
large number of interethnic interactions as we believe that most interethnic
interactions are embedded in an institution with elements of ingroup and
outgroup punishment at the same time. Fearon and Laitin (1996) suspect a
natural tendency in their spiral regime (which corresponds to our outgroup
punishment strategy profile) towards the development of features of ingroup
punishment but they did not pursue this idea more formally. In our model,
we provide such a theoretical analysis and show that the inclusion of ingroup
punishment in addition to outgroup punishment alone yields cooperation on
the equilibrium path under a wider exogenous parameter regime.
An interesting contribution is provided by Greif who uses game-theoretic
models to explain the development of institutions in history.33 In Greif et
al. (1994), he and his co-authors emphasize the role of community enforce-
ment through guilds in the development of long-distance trade in the 12th
century. In Greif (2002), he provides a historical analysis on the commu-
nity responsibility system used in Europe of the late medieval period. The
33See also Bardhan (1999) for a good review.
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community responsibility applied outgroup as well as ingroup punishment to
induce intercommunity exchange. According to Greif, it lay the foundation
for impersonal exchange relations in Europe. Our model supplements his
analysis in that it shows the efficiency gain involved in introducing ingroup
punishment to collective punishment in a simple intercommunity exchange
setting.
Examples of ingroup punishment are also found in the Ottoman Empire
where a millet system was in place. Each group could live in autonomy as
long as their millet leader was successful in monitoring and policing her group
members in interactions with outsiders (Fearon and Laitin, 1996, Dumont,
1982). Comparable to the millet system in the Ottoman Empire is the or-
ganization of the Hausa community in Yorubaland of Nigeria (Cohen, 1969).
The Hausa community used a very strong form of ingroup punishment ex-
ecuted by the Hausa Chief which served as a disciplining device to induce
cooperation not only among the group members but also towards outsiders.
Interestingly, the institution of ingroup punishment among the Hausa com-
munity resembles the view of a firm put forward by Tirole (1996). In his
model, the firm can also be seen as an institution that uses the threat of
firing people (ingroup punishment) to establish a collective reputation to-
wards outsiders. In a sense, it resembles the role the Hausa Chief plays in his
community. He is able to sustain a good collective reputation of the Hausa
community by threatening to exclude defectors from the community. The in-
stitution could thus be the reason why the Hausa traders were so successful
in maintaining the trade monopoly in Yorubaland.
These works provide an empirical backing of our analysis that the forms
of outgroup and ingroup punishment we use in our model have actually been
applied in history. In particular, Greif’s contributions underline the impor-
tance of punishment institutions for the development of markets in general.
However, not much research has been provided so far or as Greif (1993, p.525)
puts it in his introduction: "Yet not so much is known about the historical
institutional developments that enabled exchange relations to expand, even
though such knowledge can shed light on the nature and evolution of modern
institutions and facilitate the understanding of the institutional transitions
that developing economies still face."
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, we model interethnic conflicts as a possible response to an
informational problem which is inherent in interactions between players of
different ethnic groups. We assume that players are able to observe the action
choices of each outgroup pairing. However, whereas the players know which
particular player in their own group was responsible for the action choice,
they do not know who was responsible for the action choices in the other
group. This means that we have an identification problem across groups.
As a consequence, players cannot regress on punishment strategies which are
targetted on potential defectors in the other group to induce cooperation in
outgroup pairings.
This assumption may appear unrealistic given our model with only two
players in each group. It is indeed a simplification that allows us to ignore
the free rider problem of the second-order public good of ingroup punishment
(Boyd and Richerson 1992, Panchanathan and Boyd 2004). In a model with
n > 2 players in each group we would have to tackle the delicate question
of who punishes the potential defector in the same group. The execution of
ingroup punishment can be seen as a second-order public good. Each group
member has an incentive to free ride by letting the others carry the costs of
executing the ingroup punishment themselves.34 However, in this model, we
want to concentrate on the potential power of ingroup punishment strategies
for inducing cooperation with outgroup players. One might imagine, however,
that in a group with n > 2, the costs for ingroup punishing a potential
defector may be spread among the other ingroup members.35 In fact, this
would lower the individual costs for executing the minimal necessary ingroup
34The public goods problem explains why in very large groups like nations, formal
state authorities take over the role of ingroup punishment as opposed to a decentralised
system in small groups. The taxes imposed on the group members to finance the ingroup
punishment can thus be interpreted as the punisher’s costs of ingroup punishment. More
realistically, we are embedded in a system of ingroup punishment with formal as well as
informal elements.
35However, problems of diffused responsibility may arise in that every group member
expects the others to execute the ingroup punishment on the defector. The famous case
of the murder of Kitty Genovese in 1964 (see, for example, Dixit and Skeath, 1999, on
pp.389), is one tragic example of this phenomenon.
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punishment and we should observe cooperation for an even wider range of
exogenous parameters. So, in that sense, our analysis provides a lower bound
for achieving cooperation across groups.
We propose two strategy profiles that are able to induce interethnic co-
operation in a SPNE. In the first strategy profile, we consider a punishment
that is only applied by players of the other group. Here, each player in-
discriminately punishes her partner in all subsequent outgroup pairings for
a defection from an arbitrary player from the partner’s group. Since it is
a best response to this punishment strategy of the victim’s group member
to defect as well, we have a situation where one incidence of a defection is
enough to trigger an interethnic conflict where all players of both groups
defect against each other for infinitely many periods. More figuratively, this
can be interpreted as an interethnic conflict within our model.
We have seen that such an incidence of defection of an arbitrary player of
an arbitrary group creates a huge negative externality, not only on the players
of the other group but also on her own group members. Therefore, a natural
response would be that ingroup members might consider to discipline their
ingroup members by some form of ingroup punishment as well. We model
this ingroup punishment as a choice F . That is, we use a reduced form ap-
proach. In a second strategy profile, we set up a new game which adds the
option of ingroup punishment to the original game as a second stage decision.
A potential defector now gets punished either by her own group member or
by the players from the other group whenever she is matched in subsequent
outgroup pairings. Which players execute the punishment depends on the
relative costs of executing the punishment. The punisher’s costs of ingroup
punishment are a monotonically increasing function of the loss that the pun-
isher wants to induce to the potential defector in her group. The advantage
of ingroup punishment over the collective outgroup punishment is that it can
be targetted. Whether ingroup punishment is executed (it is only executed
if it is better from an individual point of view; compare to whether it should
be executed from a group’s point of view) depends on whether the future
value of cooperation (Πcc) over defection (Πdd) in outgroup interactions is
large enough, whether etc.
We have shown that the second strategy profile yields cooperation for
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a wider range of exogenous parameters depending on the function f(F ).
More specifically, this is true for all ingroup punishments where the ingroup
punishment involves less costs for the punisher than for the punished player.
However, one has to be careful with praising the ingroup punishment
device for its ability to induce interethnic cooperation. Ingroup punishment
is only a disciplining device that serves players to enforce norms within their
groups. It is an efficient way of enforcing such a norm in the sense that the
decision about the punishment lies in the hands of individuals which are able
to target the punishment on particular players.
We implicitly assumed that there is a preference for mutual cooperation
in outgroup pairings given by the assumption that Πdd < Πcc. However,
one might imagine situations where the two groups are at war entailing so
that players not only prefer the payoff Πdc over Πcc but they also value
Πdd > Πcc. The ingroup punishment could then be used in such a case to
induce group members to defect against players from the other group, i.e. to
enforce a defection norm.36 Therefore, the effect of the institution of ingroup
punishment on the level of cooperation depends on the attitude of the groups
towards each other. Whether the cooperation norm or the defection norm is
in place depends on the particular situation.37
The question on how group attitudes are formed is itself an interesting re-
36Bornstein (2003) reviews the literature on intergroup conflicts where the groups in-
teract in a team game. Each player has to decide how much to contribute to the group’s
effort. In the situation of step-level public goods, the group with the higher number of
contributors wins the game. In the situation with a continuous public good, the amount
by which the number of contributors surpasses the number of contributors of the other
group is important as well. Interestingly, there is interest conflict between the group’s in-
terest and the collective interest of both groups. The dominant strategy for an individual
is not to contribute. However, for the group’s interest, the more contributors there are in
a group, the better it is. Finally, the less contributors there are on both sides, the better
the situation for both groups.
37In our model, group members that do not follow the outgroup punishment strategy
are not punished by their group members. However, through fear of retaliation by her own
group members, it may be the case that players choose to punish players from the other
group. One could even think that during an outgroup punishment phase, the cooperation
norm essentially becomes a defection norm and each player that does not participate
in defecting against her partner in the outgroup pairings gets punished by her ingroup
members. Despite the different motive behind defecting during an outgroup punishment
phase, the outcome would be the same as with the strategy profile we propose in our
model.
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search question which we did not pursue in this model. A clear understanding
of the dynamics involved demands a closer look on the political process and
whether the ingroup punishment is decentralised (e.g. neighbour control),
centralised (by some form of state authority) or both. One could think, for
example, that those with a stronger interest in enforcing their desired group
norm have lower costs in enforcing the ingroup punishment. The coopera-
tion decision of an individual player then depends on the extent of ingroup
punishment she expects following a defection or a cooperation decision.
The model helps politicians who seek to maintain peace between the
ethnic groups of their state. They can put additional pressure on the leaders
of the ethnic groups who are designated to be responsible for the execution
of ingroup punishment within their group. So, in some ways, they can form
the norm of the ethnic group through sanctioning devices on the leaders of
the ethnic groups.38
Our model has been framed in the context of interethnic relations. In
our opinion, this simplified the presentation of the main results by making
them more intuitive as well as more figurative for the reader. However, the
areas where our model is applicable are not restricted to interethnic inter-
actions only. One can, for instance, translate the findings to shed light on
how to achieve cooperation between departments within a firm or between
international trade partners. More generally, our model offers insights for all
settings where interactions between groups are involved whose group mem-
bers are connected by some form of collective reputation.39
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A. Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
For simplicity, we set Πdd = 0. Let
V + =
P∞
t=1 δ
tηoΠ
cc
or, by convergence of the geometric sequence,
V + =
δ
1− δηoΠ
cc (12)
denote the discounted payoff of an outgroup cooperation phase, where all
players in the outgroup pairings cooperate, starting in the subsequent period.
Further, because of Πdd = 0, we have
V − = 0 (13)
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for the discounted payoff of an outgroup defection phase, where all players
apply an OGP whenever matched in an outgroup pairing.
First, we consider all subgames of class III. Given that the other player
plays strategy θ in the outgroup pairing, the best response is to defect as
well since Πcd < Πdd by assumption.
Second, we consider subgames of classes I and II. To induce an arbitrary
player to cooperate in an outgroup pairing, the short-term gain from defecting
must be lower than the long-term loss from an outgroup punishment phase.
Hence, the "no deviation" constraint must satisfy
Πdc −Πcc ≤ V + − V − (14)
or, rearranging and substituting for V +and V −,
Πdc −Πcc
Πcc
≤ δ
1− δηo
which concludes the proof.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The only purpose of executing an IGP is to make the players of the other
group forgive the defection of one’s group member. All IGP choices of F ≥ F
satisfy this forgiveness requirement. Since higher choices of F are more costly
to the punishing player, it makes no sense to choose any F > F . If a player
decides to punish at all, she will only consider an IGP of F = F .
Ingroup interactions. First, consider subgames of class eI. In such a case,
the best response is indeed not to apply any IGP since there are no gains
but only costs of FP to the punishing player from choosing F > 0. More
particularly, −FP + V + < V +. Second, consider subgames of class fII. An
IGP of F = F causes a loss of FP to the punishing player. It makes the
players from the other group forgive the defection of one’s group member.
The loss from executing the IGP has to be smaller than the gain V + − V −.
The ingroup member of the defector chooses to punish her group member in
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the second stage of ΓFP if
−FP + V + ≥ V −
or, after rearranging and substituting for V − and V +,
FP ≤ δ
1− δηoΠ
cc = FP .
Finally, consider subgames of class gIII. Given strategy φKi(FD), there
is no point in apply an IGP during an outgroup punishment phase since it
does not lead to any kind of forgiveness or any change in subsequent action
choices by the players of the other group. More particularly, the payoff
from executing the minimum IGP during an outgroup punishment phase
−FP +V − thus will always be greater than the payoff V − without any IGP.
Outgroup interactions. Consider subgames of classes I or II. There are
two situations that need to be considered. First, consider a situation where
the parameters are such that a player can anticipate that no IGP will be
executed on her if she chooses to defect.40 She cooperates if and only if
Πdc −Πcc ≤ V + − V − (15)
or, substituting for V +and V −,
Πdc −Πcc ≤ δ
1− δηoΠ
cc
which is analogous to the condition for subgame perfection of strategy profile
Θ with OGP alone in game ΓF . Next, consider a situation where a player can
anticipate that she will be punished by her group member when she defects.41
The condition for cooperation with the threat of a subsequent IGP is
Πcc + V + ≥ Πdc − FD + V +
40This is true in particular if the costs of IGP for the punishing player are very high.
41More particularly, this is the case when FD < FP .
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or
FD ≥ Πdc −Πcc. (16)
When players from a group forgive a defection as a result of an IGP, they
abstain from an OGP in all subsequent outgroup pairings. The only purpose
of forgiving lies in the incentives it creates for the group member of a defec-
tor and for the player in the outgroup pairing. First, it induces the group
member to execute an IGP on defector and to carry the cost of punishment
of defectors. Second, the anticipation of such an IGP creates the necessary
incentives for cooperation in the first stage of the game. In order to give
the proper incentives for the player in the outgroup pairing, the minimal
IGP that is demanded by the players from the other group has to be strong
enough to induce cooperation in the first stage of the game. In this sense,
constraint (16) gives the lower bound of the strategy parameter FD that still
accomplishes this goal. This lower bound can then be translated into
FP = f(FD)
which is the lower bound for the loss that has to be incurred by the punishing
player in order to make the players from the other group forgive. However,
we have seen in the first part of the proof that FP is also bounded from above
by
FP = f(FD) ≤ δ
1− δηoΠ
cc = FP
to make an IGP choice of F = F a best response given our strategy φKi(F
D).
Therefore, for the strategy profile Φ(FD) to be a SPNE, we must have
FP ≤ FP .
Finally, consider subgames of class III. Given the other player’s strategy
φKi(F
D), it is a best response to defect as well so that mutual defection is
indeed the Nash equilibrium prediction in all these subgames.
38
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider the first part. In case 1, none of the strategy profiles is able to
achieve interethnic cooperation. In case 3, both strategy profiles achieve in-
terethnic cooperation on the equilibrium path. Strategy profile Θ uses the
threat of outgroup punishment whereas strategy profile Φ(FD) relies on in-
group punishment. Case 4 is special. Here, only strategy profile Θ is an
SPNE. The costs of punishing a group member are too high relative to the
long-term gain from avoiding an outgroup punishment (FP > FP ).42 There-
fore, it is not optimal to execute an ingroup punishment in the subgames
of class fII and, as indicated above, the strategy profile Φ(FD) is not an
SPNE. However, this does not mean that strategy profile Φ(FD) is not able
to induce cooperation. We still have interethnic cooperation under strategy
profile Φ(FD) in case 4 since the threat of the outgroup punishment is strong
enough
Πdc −Πcc ≤ V + − V −
to do the job of inducing cooperation in the first stage of ΓFP .
Consider the second part. Case 2 is the case where the converse is not
true. Only strategy profile Φ(FD) is able to achieve interethnic cooperation.
More easily, we have to show that there exist cases where ∀α < 1,
2bΠ
1 + 2bΠ > δ ≥ 2αbΠ1 + 2αbΠ .
This amounts to showing that
2bΠ
1 + 2bΠ > 2αbΠ1 + 2αbΠ
or, by rearranging,
2bΠ > 2αbΠ
which is the case ∀α < 1.
42This could have been the constellation in Palestinian conflict where arresting the
terrorists on the Palestinian side was too expensive - either politically or technically - for
PLO leader Arafat.
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A.4 Proof of condition 3
The condition for cooperation with the combined punishment strategy is
derived as follows. We know that the combined strategy profile Φ(FD) is
a SPNE if and only if FP ≤ FP . Then there exists an equilibrium with
cooperative outcomes and IGP in the case of a defection. In order to check
this inequality, two conditions have to be met. The first one is the condition
for cooperation
FD ≥ Πdc −Πcc
given that an IGP will be executed. Using the linear function FP = αFD,
we get the lower bound for the costs that the punisher has to bear to induce
the player in the outgroup pairing to cooperate in the first stage. Suppose,
for simplicity, that FD is chosen to be equal to the lower bound Πdc−Πcc.43
This allows to write
FP = α(Πdc −Πcc). (17)
Next, we know that there is also an upper bound for the costs for the punisher
FP ≤ δ
1− δηoΠ
cc = FP (18)
which is the second condition. That is, FP can be as high as FP and still
we have a cooperative equilibrium with the threat of an ingroup punishment.
Higher values of FP lead to a breakdown of the equilibrium that uses an
ingroup punishment as a disciplinary mechanism. Combining conditions (17)
and (18), we get
α(Πdc −Πcc) ≤ δ
1− δηoΠ
cc. (19)
Recall that ηo =
1
2
. Rearranging (19) gives condition (11) for cooperation
with ingroup punishment
δ ≥ 2α
bΠ
1 + 2αbΠ
where bΠ := Πdc−ΠccΠcc .
43This corresponds to the most preferred strategy parameter by both groups since it
involves the lowest possible IGP costs for the punishing players that still induce interethnic
cooperation.
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However, interethnic cooperation is possible under strategy profile Φ(FD)
even if it is not a SPNE. Consider the case where the exogenous parameters
are such that
δ
1− δηoΠ
cc < α(Πdc −Πcc).
This means that it is not a best response to execute an IGP in the subgames
of class fII and the strategy profile Φ(FD) is not a SPNE. Still, interethnic
cooperation is possible on the equilibrium path as long as the threat of the
OGP is strong enough. More specifically, we need
Πdc −Πcc ≤ δ
1− δηoΠ
cc
or, by rearranging,
δ ≥ 2
bΠ
1 + 2bΠ . (20)
This allows to conclude that, whenever α ≥ 1, the condition for interethnic
cooperation under the strategy profile Φ(FD) becomes (20).
41
Working Papers of the Socioeconomic Institute at the University of Zurich 
 
 The Working Papers of the Socioeconomic Institute can be downloaded from http://www.soi.unizh.ch/research/wp/index2.html 
 
 
0601 Ain’t no puzzle anymore: Comparative statics and experimental economics, Armin 
Schmutzler, February 2006, 45 p. 
0514 Money Illusion Under Test, Stefan Boes, Markus Lipp and Rainer Winkelmann, 
November 2005, 7p. 
0513 Cost Sharing in Health Insurance: An Instrument for Risk Selection? Karolin Becker 
and Peter Zweifel, November 2005, 45p. 
0512 Single Motherhood and (Un)Equal EducationalOpportunities: Evidence for Germany, 
Philippe Mahler and Rainer Winkelmann, September 2005, 23p. 
0511 Competition for Railway Markets: The Case of Baden-Württemberg, Rafael Lalive 
and Armin Schmutzler, September 2005, 30p. 
0510 The Impact of Aging on Future Healthcare Expenditure; Lukas Steinmann, Harry 
Telser, and Peter Zweifel, September 2005, 23p. 
0509 The Purpose and Limits of Social Health Insurance; Peter Zweifel, September 2005, 
28p. 
0508 Switching Costs, Firm Size, and Market Structure; Simon Loertscher and Yves 
Schneider, August 2005, 29p. 
0507 Ordered Response Models; Stefan Boes and Rainer Winkelmann, March 2005, 21p. 
0506 Merge or Fail? The Determinants of Mergers and Bankruptcies in Switzerland, 1995-
2000; Stefan Buehler, Christian Kaiser, Franz Jaeger, March 2005, 18p. 
0505 Consumer Resistance Against Regulation: The Case of Health Care 
Peter Zweifel, Harry Telser, and Stephan Vaterlaus, February 2005, 23p. 
0504 A Structural Model of Demand for Apprentices 
Samuel Mühlemann, Jürg Schweri, Rainer Winkelmann and Stefan C. Wolter, 
February 2005, 25p. 
0503 What can happiness research tell us about altruism?Evidence from the German 
Socio-Economic Panel 
Johannes Schwarze and Rainer Winkelmann, February 2005, 26p. 
0502 Spatial Effects in Willingness-to-Pay: The Case of Nuclear Risks 
 Peter Zweifel, Yves Schneider and Christian Wyss, January 2005, 37p. 
0501 On the Role of Access Charges Under Network Competition 
Stefan Buehler and Armin Schmutzler, January 2005, 30p. 
0416 Social Sanctions in Interethnic Relations: The Benefit of Punishing your Friends 
 Christian Stoff, Dezember 2004, 51p. 
0415 Single Motherhood and (Un)equal Educational Opportunities: Evidence from 
Germany 
Philippe Mahler and Rainer Winkelmann, November 2004, 23p. 
0414 Are There Waves in Merger Activity After All? 
Dennis Gärtner and Daniel Halbheer, September 2004, 39p. 
0413 Endogenizing Private Information: Incentive Contracts under Learning By Doing 
 Dennis Gärtner, September 2004, 32p. 
0412 Validity and Reliability of Willingness-to-pay Estimates: Evidence from Two 
Overlapping Discrete-Choice Experiments 
 Harry Telser, Karolin Becker and Peter Zweifel. September 2004, 25p.  
0411  Willingness-to-pay Against Dementia: Effects of Altruism Between Patients and 
Their Spouse Caregivers 
Markus König und Peter Zweifel, September 2004, 22p. 
0410 Age and Choice in Health Insurance: Evidence from Switzerland 
 Karolin Becker and Peter Zweifel, August 2004, 30p. 
0409 Vertical Integration and Downstream Investment in Oligopoly 
Stefan Buehler and Armin Schmutzler, July 2004, 30p. 
0408 Mergers under Asymmetric Information – Is there a Leomons Problem? 
Thomas Borek, Stefan Buehler and Armin Schmutzler, July 2004, 38p. 
0407 Income and Happiness: New Results from Generalized Threshold 
and Sequential Models 
Stefan Boes and Rainer Winkelmann, June 2004, 30p. 
0406 Optimal Insurance Contracts without the Non-Negativity Constraint  
on Indemnities Revisited 
Michael Breuer, April 2004, 17p. 
0405 Competition and Exit: Evidence from Switzerland 
Stefan Buehler, Christian Kaiser and Franz Jaeger, March 2004, 28p. 
0404 Empirical Likelihood in Count Data Models: The Case of Endogenous Regressors 
Stefan Boes, March 2004, 22p. 
0403 Globalization and General Worker Training 
Hans Gersbach and Armin Schmutzler, February 2004, 37p. 
0402 Restructuring Network Industries: Dealing with Price-Quality Tradeoffs 
Stefan Bühler, Dennis Gärtner and Daniel Halbheer, January 2004, 18p. 
0401 Deductible or Co-Insurance: Which is the Better Insurance Contract under Adverse 
Selection? 
Michael Breuer, January 2004, 18p. 
0314 How Did the German Health Care Reform of 1997 Change the Distribution of the 
Demand for Health Services? 
Rainer Winkelmann, December 2003, 20p. 
0313 Validity of Discrete-Choice Experiments – Evidence for Health Risk Reduction 
Harry Telser and Peter Zweifel, October 2003, 18p. 
0312 Parental Separation and Well-Being of Youths 
Rainer Winkelmann, October 2003, 20p. 
0311 Re-evaluating an Evaluation Study: The Case of the German Health Care Reform of 
1997 
Rainer Winkelmann, October 2003, 23p. 
0310 Downstream Investment in Oligopoly 
Stefan Buehler and Armin Schmutzler, September 2003, 33p. 
0309 Earning Differentials between German and French Speakers in Switzerland 
Alejandra Cattaneo and Rainer Winkelmann, September 2003, 27p. 
0308 Training Intensity and First Labor Market Outcomes of Apprenticeship Graduates 
Rob Euwals and Rainer Winkelmann, September 2003, 25p. 
0307 Co-payments for prescription drugs and the demand for doctor visits – Evidence 
from a natural experiment 
Rainer Winkelmann, September 2003, 22p. 
0306 Who Integrates? 
Stefan Buehler and Armin Schmutzler, August 2003, 29p. 
0305 Strategic Outsourcing Revisited 
Stefan Buehler and Justus Haucap, July 2003, 22p. 
